Introduction
The Split Share Structure Reform, which began in 2005, is hailed as one of the most significant capital market and corporate ownership reform in China (Chen et al., 2012) . We examine the impact of this reform on the relationship between executive remuneration and stock return performance of Chinese listed firms. This reform requires all restricted shares held by state shareholders to be converted into tradable shares equivalent to those held by private shareholders.
1 Therefore, this reform should align the wealth implications of share price movement on both state and private shareholders. 2 We expect the impact of this reform to be more pronounced among Chinese firms controlled by state ownership, since it enhances the incentives of the dominant shareholders to monitor and ensure that executives maximize firm value. Our study contributes to two strands of literature. For the growing literature on Chinese capital market, we provide original evidence on whether this major regulatory intervention benefited the minority shareholders by increasing managerial accountability to the stock market. For the ownership structure literature, we apply a unique setting of an exogenously induced reduction in the conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders to evaluate the effect of such a conflict on agency costs.
Previous literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002) suggests two counteracting effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance. First, large shareholders can cause an entrenchment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008) , which is similar to the situation when managerial ownership increases beyond an optimal point (e.g., Stulz, 1988; Morck et al., 1998; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . As a result of their dominance in control, such shareholders can affect the management to pursue their own benefit, and are less subject to stock market discipline of outside investors. Second, large shareholders can also be associated with an incentive alignment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gomes, 2000) if their interest and wealth are associated with the value of the firm they control. Due to this alignment, such shareholders are discouraged from expropriating their firm, which may reduce their share value in the stock market. In our setting, state shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms are more linked to the entrenchment effect prior to the Split Share Structure Reform since the restricted share they hold deprives them of wealth gains from higher firm value in the market. We argue that the opportunity to trade their shares and cash in from rising stock price of their firm enabled by this reform tilts the state shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms toward the incentive alignment effect.
The state control of Chinese listed firms has often been blamed for impeding corporate governance reforms and performance, against the interests of outside investors (e.g., Fan et al., 2007) .
This control is characterized by two main features. First, executives are appointed and/or influenced by the state. As a result, the typical agency problems (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ) are considered to be more pronounced in state controlled firms. This is because their executives are more insulated from effective supervision by the capital market, and they have greater incentives to extract benefits and/or withhold value relevant information from outside investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
Second, state ownership is mainly of restricted shares that are not tradable in the stock market, unlike their unrestricted and tradable counterparts, which are held largely by private shareholders. This is known as the split share structure (see Section 2.2 for further discussion of the institutional background), and it causes stock price movements to affect the wealth of minority shareholders but not that of dominating shareholders. Instead, the state controlling shareholders gain either political credit, by ensuring that executives carry out government initiatives, or dividends, if the firm makes reasonable profits. This is the source of the conflicts of interest between the dominant and minority shareholders in Chinese state controlled listed firms. Since the wealth of controlling state shareholders is insulated against changes in the share price, they are less motivated than minority shareholders to ensure that the executives maximize firms' market value. Empirical studies have documented the adverse impact of state control and ownership in Chinese listed firms on share price informativeness (Gul et al., 2010) , CEO turnover to performance sensitivity (Conyon and He, 2008) , and CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Firth et al., 2006; 2007) .
The state ownership of listed firms stems from the intention to maintain governmental influence, as a result of China's political ideology and transitional economy. However, aware of the ailments resulting from state ownership, China has allowed firm-specific voluntary ownership transfers, by which state ownership can be transferred to private entities at firms' choice (Hou and Howell, 2012) .
In theory, increased private ownership should strengthen outside investor monitoring and increase firm executives' accountability to the capital market (e.g., Boycko et al., 1996; Denis and McConnell, 2003) . For instance, Chen et al. (2008) show improved operating performance in Chinese firms that voluntarily switch from state to private controlling shareholders. However, China still has weaker legal enforcement and shareholder protection than developed countries. In such an institutional environment, increasing private ownership alone may not necessarily be enough to strengthen managerial incentives to maximize shareholder wealth (e.g., Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . Given the dilemma surrounding the need to strengthen corporate governance, and the reluctance to relinquish government control entirely, abolishing the split share structure between state and private ownership becomes an obvious solution. Aligning the incentives of dominant and minority shareholders may strengthen corporate governance and reduce agency costs among state controlled Chinese listed firms. Starting from 2005, China piloted the Split Share Structure Reform first on a small batch of listed firms and subsequently expanded it to all listed firms, which were required to terminate the trading constraints imposed on their restricted shares, to enable these shares to become tradable.
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Following a previously failed attempt, the Chinese capital market authority was now determined to make this round of reform successful. For instance, Firth et al. (2010) show that state controlled firms pay higher consideration for the release of restricted shares to the stock market to compensate existing tradable shareholders relative to private shareholder-controlled firms, and they interpret this as evidence of pressure being exerted by the Chinese capital market authority.
Although the holdings of dominant shareholders in state-controlled firms may remain unchanged, the values of all shares are now subject to price movements in the capital market. In other words, both the state and private shareholders now benefit when executives increase firms' market value. Thus, the incentives of both groups of shareholders are now more aligned to ensure that executives improve firm's share return performance. An effective way of achieving this is through executives' remuneration arrangement, i.e. to increase the relationship between executive pay and share return performance. As a result, we predict that executive remuneration in state-controlled
Chinese listed firms will become more associated with stock returns after the reform. Empirical evidence in favor of this prediction implies that the reform has benefitted the Chinese capital market, by strengthening the controlling shareholders' incentives to hold executives more accountable to the objective of firm value maximization. To confirm our prediction, we compare the relationship between executive pay to share return performance before and after the reform was finalized. We expect state shareholders' incentive to increase their firms' market value to be triggered once this reform is imminent and the process commences by end of 2005. This assumption is reasonable and intuitive since increasing share price even before trading restriction is fully eliminated would allow state shareholders to cash in more should they decide to sell the moment their shares turn tradable.
With state shareholders interested in share return performance of their firms, minority private shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms gets greater assurance that the dominant shareholders will strengthen their supervision of managers to promote share value maximization.
We assume that the alignment of interest between controlling and minority shareholders brought about by the reform is likely to make a greater difference among state-controlled than privately-controlled Chinese listed firms. Therefore, we classify the state-controlled firms as the treatment group (where we expect to observe empirical evidence in support of our hypotheses) and privately-controlled firms as the control group (where we expect not to observe empirical evidence in support of our hypotheses) in our analyses. To be able to infer that the reform exerts the impact we predict, we need to observe, following the reform, significantly more pronounced increases in the relationship between executive pay and share return performance in the treatment group than in the control groups. Otherwise, either there has been no change in this relationship, or the change is not brought about by the reform, but by some unidentified confounding effect. et al. (2006; 2007) although both studies are based on earlier sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) . During the post-reform period, we observe among such firms a significant increase in the relationship of executive pay and share return performance. In contrast, no such increase is observed for the association between executive pay to operating performance. This finding confirms our prediction that the incentive alignment between dominant and minority shareholders prompts the former to strengthen the link between executive remuneration and market value of the state-controlled Chinese listed firms, i.e. our treatment group. Among the privately-controlled firms, during the pre-reform period we observe that executive remuneration is significantly and positively related with share return performance but not operating performance (i.e. the opposite of state-controlled firms). This is again broadly consistent with Firth et al. (2006; 2007) despite the difference in sample period. During the post-reform period, we observe among such firms no incremental effect in executive remuneration's relation with either share return or operating performance. The observation of no reform effect in the control group strengthens our inference that the increase in relationship between executive remuneration to share returns performance in our treatment group is indeed due to the incentive alignment effect between dominant and minority shareholders in the post-reform period.
Further analyses within our treatment group reveal that the increase in relationship between executive pay and share return performance after the reform is more pronounced among Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, explains the institutional background, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodologies.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and hypotheses

Ownership and executive compensation in China
The relationship between corporate ownership structure and executive compensation is well established in the corporate governance literature on western developed economies. Ownership structure plays a crucial role in corporate governance, which deals with the agency problem induced by the separation of ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Large shareholders are assumed to have more incentives, and to be more effective in monitoring executives, and so have greater potential to reduce the agency problem (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002) . Holderness and Sheeban (1988) find positive market reaction intended to block trades that would create a dominant shareholder. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) document that the presence of large shareholders is associated with increased management turnover. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) Morck et al. (2000) , is more pronounced among state-controlled firms.
The existing corporate governance literature suggests two possible reasons for this. First, since the executives of state-controlled listed firms are appointed and influenced by the government, they are insulated from the monitoring of outside investors, and are expected to pursue political rather than profit-maximizing objectives (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Second, the concentration of state ownership in such firms encourages collusion between executives to divert firm resources (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002) , and/or to extract benefits (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) Yueh, 2004; Chang and Wong, 2009; Firth et al, 2010) , in Chinese listed firms the corporate governance characteristics exert limited influence over executive pay (Cha, 2001; Li et al., 2007; Tong et al., 2003) . There is also limited use and disclosure of executive stock options, and this is perhaps because of higher turnover, and/or Chinese CEOs preference for cash over stock (Firth et al., 2006) . Kato and Long (2006a,b) find that privately controlled Chinese listed firms are associated with better subsequent performance following CEO replacement. Conyon and He (2008) find that CEO turnover has weaker sensitivity to share price performance for firms controlled by the state. Ke et al. (2012) show that no turnover to performance sensitivity among Chinese state-controlled listed firms in Hong Kong. Firth et al. (2006; 2007) show that CEO compensation is sensitive to operating performance, but not to share price performance, among state-controlled Chinese listed firms. They also emphasize that these sensitivities are low, and unlikely to provide executives with incentives to increase profit and firm values. Cao et al. (2011) also that pay-performance in state-controlled firms are more related to accounting performance and that of non-state firms are more related to market-based performance. These empirical findings generally imply that executives in Chinese listed firms controlled by state ownership are not contracted to maximize shareholder wealth.
Split Share Structure Reform in China
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established in the early 1990s and currently exchanges and can only be transferred privately, usually at a discounted value relative to the firm's freely tradable shares, which are largely held by outside private investors.
The split share structure stems from the socio-political ideology in China. On the one hand, the government still wishes to retain influence in firms, in order to achieve political and social objectives.
On the other hand, the government also wants Chinese firms to transform into modern enterprises that are capable of raising their own capital, thus reducing state subsidies. However, studies by Sun and
Tong (2003) and Wei et al. (2005) suggest that partial privatization and the split share structure reduce firms' corporate governance quality and performance efficiency. The restricted shares of controlling state shareholders can change hands through two channels. First, they can be transferred with the authorities' approval, in which case the transfer price is often set near the book value (e.g., Xu, 2003) .
Second, they can be auctioned, but with a substantial illiquidity discount in their value, due to the lack of tradability. For instance, Chen and Xiong (2001) document a 77.93% discount and Huang and Xu (2009) document a discount of over 70%. Firth et al. (2006) argue that holding restricted shares gives less incentive for the controlling state shareholders to monitor executives to ensure that they maximize stock value. They find some evidence that state shareholders focus more on accounting performance, which facilitates them receiving dividend payouts and/or political credits. However, accounting performance can be subject to managerial manipulation (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987) , and it does not necessarily ensure shareholder wealth maximization. Although state ownership can be sold to outside private investors, which would result in a change in control (e.g., Chen et al., 2008) , this has been done only on a voluntary basis, and the shares transferred remained restricted and untradeable. The benefits brought by the reform have recently attracted the attention of researchers.
Empirical studies show that following this reform there is significant reduction in average cash holdings (Chen et al, 2012) , decrease of foreign share discount , and increase of stock informativeness and CEO turnover-fraud sensitivities (Cumming et al., 2011) . These findings are consistent with the reform leading to improved corporate governance, possibly through better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Hypothesis development
The aforementioned literature highlights two key issues related to our study. First, the ownership structure affects the corporation's governance quality, which in turn determines executive compensation. Second, Chinese listed firms are heavily dominated by state ownership, and these state owners have had the prior trading restrictions on the shares they held lifted as a result of the reform.
We intersect these two issues and argue that the Split Share Structure Reform, which seeks to render restricted shares tradable, should affect the relationship between executive remuneration and shareholder wealth in Chinese state-controlled listed firms.
Our rationale is as follows. Prior to the reform, the untradeable restricted shares held by controlling state shareholders had low liquidity and value. Transfers of unrestricted shares were infrequent and occurred only after approval by the authorities. Even if the transfers took place the price of such shares was set substantially lower than that of tradable shares due to their illiquidity discount, and was often close to the book value. As a result, controlling state shareholders received no wealth gains from rises in the stock market value of the tradable shares. Therefore, they had limited incentive to appraise executives using stock price performance, or to monitor them on behalf of minority private shareholders in order to maximize the market value of the firm. Following the reform, the shares held by the controlling shareholders have become tradable in the stock market.
Thus, the state owners now receive wealth gains from rises in share prices, as do their minority shareholder counterparts. The controlling shareholders therefore have a greater incentive to monitor executives, and to ensure that they maximize shareholders' wealth. A direct and effective way of increasing managerial incentives to maximize their firm's market value is through their remuneration scheme. Therefore we hypothesize that: little from rising share price and therefore less incentive to adjust executive remuneration scheme to pursue this objective. In other words, the influence of the reform in incentivizing controlling shareholders to monitor and ensure managers maximize firm's market value is moderated in SASAC controlled firms due to reasons other than the split share structure per se. 5 As a result, the efficacy of the reform in strengthening corporate governance by increasing the relationship between managerial pay and performance is likely to be lower among SASAC state-controlled firms than their counterparts not controlled by SASAC. It is possible to rationalize this within the framework of agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency cost for the principal includes expenditures to monitor and incentivize the agent, as well as the residual loss of firm value caused by divergence of interest between principal and agent. For state-controlled firms prior to the reform under the split share structure and for SASAC controlled firms both before and after the reform, the controlling shareholders are exposed to less residual loss of firm value from the dimension of their firms stock market performance. When the principal is exposed to less residual loss of firm value, they are less willing to bear the cost to monitor and incentivize the agent. The Split Share Structure
Reform increases the exposure of controlling state shareholders to residual loss of firm value associate with stock return performance only for non-SASAC state-controlled firms but not for their SASAC controlled counterparts. Thus, within our treatment group we further identify these two groups of state-controlled firms and we hypothesize that: Second, we expect state-controlled firms that payout more restricted shares as part of the reform consideration to existing holders of unrestricted shares to have more incentives to improve share return performance after the reform. This is because such firms are paying higher cost to participate in this reform, which implies that the dominating state shareholders place a higher value on the tradability of their shares after the reform and are also more motivated to recuperate this cost through potential wealth gains from trading their shares. Thus, we hypothesize that: There are some possible factors that could bias against us finding evidence consistent with our aforementioned hypotheses. First, the Chinese stock markets are not efficient enough to warrant using stock return performance as a suitable measure to evaluate firm performance. However, studies such as Fan and Zhang (1998) and Hu (1998) suggest that the Chinese stock market is weak-form and semi-strong-form efficient. Second, the financial crisis has overlapped with our post-reform period, and could add substantial noise to our analyses. However, the financial crisis is likely to affect both state-and private-dominated Chinese listed firms simultaneously. Third, Chinese convergence toward the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) also overlaps with our post-reform period. If the financial reporting quality improves, then accounting numbers will become more verifiable, and firms may prefer accounting performance over stock-return performance, as a way of appraising executives and determining their remuneration. 6 Again, this is likely to affect both stateand privately-controlled listed firms. Finally, there may be some non-SASAC state-controlled firms where government is also keen to retain control and in such firms the state shareholders may also be reluctant to sell their shares after the reform in order to avoid losing control. In such firms, there could also be a lack of change in controlling state-shareholders incentives following the reform, just like their SASAC counterparts. Since it is difficult and beyond the scope of our study to determine government's choice of firm to retain control, we leave this for further study.
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For hypothesis H1, there are two possible counterarguments. First, there is no increase in state shareholders' interest in maximizing stock value until all restricted shares of a firm become fully tradable, and this will be 36 months after the implementation of the consideration scheme in the reform process of each firm. In other words, it would not be possible to study the impact of the reform across the complete Chinese stock market based on a pre-2011 sample and our study would not be Those who held on to their shareholdings could be doing so in anticipation of long-term growth prospect of their firms' market value.
Sample and Methodology
Sample description
Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. Listed firms are required to disclose executive compensation from 1998 onward, but we skip the first two years due to lack of data for a wide cross-section of firms.
From GTA/CSMAR we obtain our measure of executive compensation, which is the aggregated total pay of the top three executives; this measure has been used by existing studies such as Kato and Long (2005) . 10 From CCER (China Center of Economic Research) we obtain firm characteristic variables, such as stock returns, operating income, sales, total assets, leverage, special treatment status, board size, number of board meetings, proportion of independent directors, managerial ownership, CEO duality, regional classification, industrial classification, state control status, and reform consideration.
Our final sample requires all the aforementioned variables to have valid values, and has 7,695
observations. 
The dependent variable ExecPAY i,t is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives for firm i at year t (in thousand RMB respectively.
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The data for the aggregated pay of the top three executives has also been used by previous studies, e.g., Kato and Long (2005) . Total pay comprises cash salary, bonus, and commissions. As discussed by Firth et al. (2006) , the individual items cannot be broken down, and options are either rarely used or disclosed. In measuring operating performance, we follow Firth et al. (2006) by using operating income scaled by sales. Our definition of state control covers both central and local government through both state and legal person shares. Our choice of control variables follows the executive pay literature, i.e., firm size (e.g., Conyon, 1998), leverage (e.g., Basu et al., 2007; Hernan, 2007) , growth opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 1999) , and board characteristics (e.g., Conger et al., 1998) . We also control for regional effects, because there are substantial disparities in living expenses and wages between the coastal and interior regions of China Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Across our full sample (i.e., including both state-controlled and privately-controlled listed firms) and over our sample period (i.e., 2000 to 2007), the average aggregate remuneration of the top three executives (ExecPay) is around RMB 568 thousand. 14 The average annual stock return (RET) is 34.87%, which reflects the rising stock value of listed firms in the Chinese stock markets over this period. The average profitability of our sampled firms, measured by operating income divided by sales (ROS), is 1.0%. The average firm in our sample has debt-to-equity ratio of 48.23% and experiences around 26.83% annual sales growth. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in our analyses. We note that ExecPay level is significantly positively correlated with both the market and operating performance indicators, i.e., RET and ROS. Throughout our sample, firms with higher leverage or are loss making pay significantly less to executives. On the other hand, listed firms that are larger in size and are based in higher income regions (Shanghai and Shenzhen) tend to pay significantly more.
Empirical findings
Descriptive statistics and correlation
[insert Table 2 here]
[insert Table 3 here] firms becomes more related to share return performance while its association with operating performance did not change after the Split Share Structure Reform. In other words, we have evidence that state-controlled firms adjusted executive remuneration scheme to appraise managerial performance more through share returns after the reform. The observation that executive remuneration increased relationship only with share return but not with operating performance strengthens our inference that this effect is attributed to the reform instead of some unidentified confounding effects that influence the state-controlled firms.
Test of hypothesis H 1
[insert Table 4 here]
Turning to privately-controlled firms, notice that the coefficient on RET is significantly positive but not the coefficient on ROS. This implies that privately-controlled firms' executive remuneration is more associated with share return performance than operating performance prior to the reform. This finding is again broadly similar to Firth et al (2006 Firth et al ( , 2007 SSSRRET is statistically significant. This suggests that the reform did not change the association between the executive pay of such firms with both share return and operating performance. The contrast in result between state-controlled (treatment group) and privately-controlled (control group) firms in Table 4 through the coefficient on SSSRRET confirms our prediction in hypothesis H 1 . Since the effect we find is confined to the treatment group and does not exist in the control group mitigates the possibility that our results is attributed to some unidentified confounding affect that influence all listed firms in Chinese stock market. Our results in Table 4 are robust to controls of firm characteristics and corporate governance.
As shown in Table 1 there is an upward time trend in executive pay level both among state-and privately-controlled firms. However, since this pay inflation effect is observed in both groups of firms, this reduces the possibility that it is the underlying cause of our finding in Table 4 , where we show increased pay to performance relationship only for stock returns and only in state-controlled firms.
There is also possibility that some managers may use the reform as an excuse to increase pay regardless of performance. If this effect is systematic, then we should observe in Table 4 that the relationship between pay and performance decline following the reform. However in both state-and privately-controlled firms, we observe no statistically significant decline in pay to performance relationship after the reform. The only change in this relationship after the reform is an increase among state-controlled listed firms, which we rationalize as improved governance following reform among such firms. Table 4 exist only in firms that are not expected to maintain government control, i.e. the non-SASAC firms. In firms where state shareholders have little to gain from the reform, i.e. the SASAC, we observe no such effect. Thus, the finding in Table 5 not only confirms our prediction in hypothesis H 2 but further strengthens the inference that the effect we find (i.e. increased relation between executive pay and share return among state-controlled firms) is attributed to the Split Share Structure Reform.
Test of hypothesis H2
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[insert Table 5 here] Table 6 presents the findings of our analyses by splitting the state-controlled listed firms into those that pay more or less restricted shares to holders of unrestricted shares as consideration package. Panels A and B partition the sample by payout ratio and cost ratio respectively. The payout ratio is the number of restricted shares paid out divided by total number of restricted shares, and cost ratio is the number of restricted shares paid out divided by the number of restricted shares that remains after the payout. We argue that state shareholders that payout more of their restricted shares as consideration to holders of unrestricted shares are more committed to enhance market value of the firm after the reform. This is because they paid a higher cost to participate in the reform and therefore would like to recuperate this cost by having the option to cash in their restricted shares from higher share price. In other words, controlling shareholders of such firms have greater incentive to adjust executive remuneration schemes to pressure or entice managers to work toward improving firms'
Test of hypothesis H3
share return performance. We confirm this in both Panels A and B that the coefficient on the interactive term SSSRRET is significantly positive only in state-controlled firms that payout more restricted shares. For instance, in Panel A this coefficient is 96.78 (t-statistics = 2.76) in the higher payout ratio group and only 46.31 (t-statistics = 1.20) in the lower payout ratio group. An F test on the difference between them is significant at 1% level. In Panel B we get broadly similar results. Our findings in Table 6 not only confirms the prediction in hypothesis H 3 , but also strengthens the inference that the increase in relationship between executive remuneration and share return performance that we observe in support of hypothesis H 1 and H 2 are indeed attributed to the Split Share Structure Reform.
[insert Table 6 here]
Conclusion
We provide empirical evidence that the executive remuneration is more sensitive to share return performance among state-controlled listed firms in China since the Split Share Structure Reform was formalized in late 2005. Prior to the reform, the controlling state shareholders held restricted shares that were not tradable in the stock exchanges, and so enjoy no wealth benefit from rising share prices.
This gave the dominant shareholders limited incentives to appraise executives using share returns.
Following the reform, we argue that the conversion of the restricted shares held by the controlling shareholders of these firms into tradable shares aligned the wealth impact of share price movement between the dominant and minority shareholders. This gives the controlling shareholders a greater incentive to adjust executive remuneration schemes in ways that entice executives to maximize firm value. We confirm this effect empirically by documenting an increased relationship between executive remuneration and share return performance after the reform in state-controlled but not privately-controlled Chinese listed firms. Among the state-controlled firms, this effect is more pronounced among those with higher state ownership and greater consideration payout by restricted shares.
Our results have two key implications. First, we confirm that the Split Share Structure Reform in China created benefits for minority shareholders of Chinese listed firms, since it increased managerial accountability for share price movement. This highlights the importance of regulatory intervention, especially in transitional economies that have not yet built a strong shareholder protection regime and information disclosure environment. This also suggests that ending the split share structure per se is effective in strengthening corporate governance among Chinese listed firms, even without further ownership reform. Second, using a unique setting of exogenously induced reduction in conflicts of interests between dominant and minority shareholders, we show that such reduction could strengthen corporate governance and reduce agency costs. This is an important finding, since it illustrates that the western PLC corporate form need not be a panacea in transitional economies. An economy that resists full privatization and ownership dispersion for socio-political reasons, can still improve minority shareholder rights, reduce agency costs, improve corporate governance, and maintain the strong monitoring role of a dominant state shareholder, as long as there is a proper alignment of interests between the different classes of shareholders.
Our findings also open up some interesting research questions for future study. 17 For instance, it will be interesting to examine whether non-SASAC listed firms are associated with better stock return performance following the Split Share Structure Reform. If controlling shareholders of these firms improve corporate governance by increasing the link between executive pay with stock return performance, then this should increase the motives of managers in these firms to focus on value enhancing projects and avoid value deteriorating decisions. However, unlike their privately-controlled counterparts, state-controlled listed firms are also associated with the responsibility to forward government socio-political objectives in addition to profitability and stock value maximization. The government may not necessarily reward managers who achieve these objectives through pay but through non-pecuniary returns such as promotion in the political party.
This also provides an interesting research question for further study in China. ExecPAY is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms `with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. Table 3  Correlation analyses This table presents the correlation analyses of the variables used in our analyses. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. ExecPAY is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. RMB) . SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and (SASAC) . The dependent variable is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and *** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. (Panel B) is number of restricted shares paid out divided by the number of restricted shares that are not paid out. The dependent variable is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and *** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Firth et al., 2010) . Following the ratification of the scheme, the restricted shares offered as part of the consideration payout become immediately tradable while the rest of the restricted shares are still not tradable for another 12 months. After this period, all restricted shareholders can freely trade their shares apart from those large shareholders who possess 5% or more of a listed firm's shares. Such shareholders are not allowed to trade more than 5% and 10% of their restricted shares within the next 12 and 24 months respectively. After 36 months following the ratification of the compensation, the reform process completes and all restricted shares of the firm become fully tradable. Section 2.2 provides further discussion. 4 Cheung et al (2010) show positive relationship between corporate governance and the market valuation of Chinese listed firms, and this relationship is mainly driven by issues associated with shareholder rights. Thus, our finding that minority shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms benefit from the Split Share Structure Reform implies that this reform could contribute to the market valuation of such firms. 5 For instance, Chen et al. (2006) show that the SASAC based state-controlled firms are associated with significantly lower post-listing stock return performance than other state-controlled firms. 6 He et al. (2009) found no empirical evidence suggesting that the mandatory adoption of IFRS improved the earnings quality of Chinese firms. Their result mitigates the possibility that the evidence we find in support of our hypotheses is attributed to the IFRS mandatory adoption instead of the Split Share Structure Reform 7 We than the referee for this suggestion. 8 This policy has been announced in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline for the Long-Range Objective Through the Year 2010 (see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/134999/135000/8104918.html, in Chinese) 9 For an example, see http://www.chinasecurities.com.cn/xwzx/11/200804/t20080430_1445678.htm (in Chinese). 10 Although the GTA/CSMAR database also provides details on CEO pay only, the data coverage on this variable is limited, therefore its use will substantially reduce our ability to generalize our findings to the cross-section of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 11 We also replicated our analyses using logarithm value of executive pay and these additional analyses yield similar inference to our main findings. We also replicated the regression in Equation 1 using lagged independent variables and obtained qualitatively similar results. However, for brevity we do not tabulate these findings. 12 Based on Core and Guay (1999) coefficient α 3 can also be interpreted as pay-to-performance sensitivity. There is debate in the literature on the proper definition of incentives, i.e., whether pay-performance sensitivity should be measured as change in executive wealth for a firm's percent or "dollar" return performance. The latter specification assumes that the executive marginal product of effort is constant across firm size, which is a valid assumption only when considering actions that do not scale with firm size, e.g., the purchase of a corporate jet (Baker and Hall, 2004; p. 769) . Our specification, instead assumes that the marginal product scales proportionally with firm size, which is valid when considering executive actions that affect the overall value of the firm. We also add independently a proxy of firm size to control for its effect. 13 If bull market in our sample period drives our findings on increased pay to performance association post-reform, then we should observe this impact on both state controlled and privately controlled listed firms alike. The fact that we observe greater change in this association among state controlled firms, which are more sensitive to the reform than privately controlled firms, is consistent with our hypothesis and strengthens our inference that it is due at least partly (but also significantly) to the reform. It is important to note that we are not doing a time-series analyses that uses some index portfolio to observe temporal changes. Our research design accounts for cross-sectional variations in firm's sensitivity to the reform. We argue that the state controlled firms are more sensitive to the reform than private controlled firms. The empirical evidence we find is consistent with this prediction. Any systematic market wide impact, such as bear/bull markets, on the relations we investigate in this paper will only bias against us finding evidence consistent with our hypotheses, and will not bias in favour of our results. 14 Incentive pay such as stock options was not introduced in China until 2007 onward. Since there is no data prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, it is not possible for us to evaluate the impact of this reform on this form of executive pay. The introduction of executive stock options is likely to influence managerial incentives for both state-controlled and privately-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this introduction is only likely to bias us against finding evidence in support of our hypotheses. 15 We acknowledge the importance of commenting in the paper about the economic significance of our results. As we already indicate in the manuscript the association between pay and performance in state-controlled firms is both statistically and economically insignificant. However, the effect of the reform on the relation is statistically significant. From a shareholder perspective, any non-zero association is preferable to a zero one. Thus, we argue shareholders are better off. Please note that our modelling approach allows for non-monotonic relations (post-reform), so it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of interest as marginal effects. 16 Using the full sample, we also carried out further regression analyses that include a SASAC dummy variable (equivalent to 1 for firms controlled by SASAC and 0 otherwise) as well as the interaction term of this dummy variable with SSSR×RET and SSSR×ROS in Equation 1 along with all independent variables. These results confirm that the improvement in the association between executive pay and stock return performance following the reform is less pronounced among the SASAC group. For brevity we do not tabulate these findings. 17 We thank the two reviewers for suggesting these future research questions that can be conducted on the basis of the findings from our study.
